8. Let’s All Proceed Calmly Toward The Exit Strategies

Primary Candidate Bush was conflicted about the bombings in Yugoslavia.  Initially he sought to play down foreign policy issues. (At the time he was still having problems with basic geography, confusing Slovakia with Slovenia and referring to the Kosovar refugees as "Kosovanians".) After all, his own father, had elected to do nothing while the former Yugoslavia tore itself apart in front of a huge world audience on satellite TV. Bush Senior’s Secretary of State, James Baker, returning from a trip to the Balkans in 1992 picturesquely remarked, "We have no dog in this fight".  George W. the son, as a primary candidate, supported Clinton's decision to bomb in Yugoslavia-- because, he said in an interview with PBS's Jim Lehrer, the US had a "national strategic interest" in Europe, and he "worried it would affect NATO". At the time he was not a unilateralist, or demonstrably a champion of humanitarian intervention. However, rather than actually closing ranks behind President Clinton, Bush called the Commander-in-chief's actions "late" and "haphazard".

Later in the same interview Lehrer got George W. to fill in some of the gaps in his foreign affairs prospectus concerning the use of American troops, "In other words," said Bush, "there will be circumstances that will obviously -- if merited -- dictate the use of troops, so long as we commit troops to win and there's an exit strategy." Next Lehrer brought up Somalia. Here the dutiful son was forced to do a little fancy footwork, since his own father had initially committed the troops. "Well, obviously it's an issue of -- that my dad was involved when clearly -- when the mission evolved from one of humanitarian help to one of, you know, of politics, the mission lost its bearings. I don't know if I would have done the same thing if I were President Bush or not under those circumstances." When Lehrer pressed him by asking if Africa fit into his definition of strategic interests Governor Bush replied bluntly, "No. It fits into my definition of economic interest, and that's why I try to promote free trade. But last night [during a Republican primary debate], when we were talking about troops in Rwanda, I would not have committed troops in Rwanda under the circumstances as I know them." Lehrer asked why, Bush explained: "Well, because it's not -- at some point in time the president has got to clearly define what the national strategic interests are, and while Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them. Now, that doesn't mean that we couldn't have rallied folks such as the United Nations to go help keep warring parties apart in Rwanda, but at some point in time the president has got to clearly define what is in our interests."

Lehrer went on to query Bush’s definition of U.S. interests with respect to humanitarian concerns:

“JIM LEHRER: So you would disagree with what Senator McCain said last night, that there are -- there are some times, in addition to strategic interests -- human rights or U.S. values' interests -- for introducing U.S. troops?

GOV. GEORGE W. BUSH: Well, I would never say 'never,' but I am going to be very hesitant to deploy troops outside those areas that I've defined as our national strategic interests.”

Thus in mid-campaign, the Bush strategy was to play down foreign policy differences with the Democrats; foreign policy was seen as an issue where the governor was not particularly strong.  After all, as governor of Texas he had little to point to in the way of experience.  As the election neared and the polls showed a virtual deadlock, however, the campaign began searching for new vulnerabilities in the their opponent. They floated trial balloons to test the wisdom of going after Gore on Kosovo—not the war itself, which by most accounts was a success story for the Clinton Administration, but on the continued presence of troops there. In the classic manner of Bush politics, they did this indirectly, through spokespersons, allowing the candidate himself a way to back out of any unfavorable consequences.  In October, 2002, Condoleezza Rice revealed in a New York Times interview that Bush was against tying up US forces in a peacekeeping role. If elected he would pull US troops out of the former Yugoslavia and leave the peacekeeping to the Europeans. Ari Fleischer echoed the message, "The governor has made very clear the role of our military should be to fight and win wars and not to be the peacekeepers around the world.'' Of course, President George Bush, when he got into office ended up extending Clinton’s National Emergencies Directive authorizing continuance of American peacekeeping in the Balkans.

Comparing Bush 2000 to Bush 2002 then, we would at least have to observe that his moral clarity as a candidate had a strong component of selectivity. Mass graves filled with Bosnians, Kosovars, and Tutsis seemed to inspire him with less moral outrage than those filled with the Iraqis and Kurds of his post-9/11 rhetoric.  Apparently mass murder by poison gas is more abhorrent than mass murder with clubs, knives, machetes, artillery, or just good old-fashioned gunpowder and lead. Furthermore, atrocities west of the Red Sea and south of Saudi Arabia, i.e. in non-Arab Africa, should awaken in us a deep sense of duty to promote free trade or should be handled by the "folks" at the UN, while those occurring nearer to vast repositories of recoverable oil require a real moral commitment in the form of troops. And the exit strategy is now optional.

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